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LIBEL-.NEWSPAPER CORPORATION-MALICE OF REPORTERPUNITIVE DAMAGE.-Willes, J., in Barwick v. English Joint

Stock Bank (1867), Ex. Ch. L. R., 2 Ex. 259, said, "The
master is answerable for every such wrong of the servant or
agent as is committed in the course of -the service and for the
master's benefit, though no express command or privity of the
master be- proved." In other Words, the doctrine of "respondeat superior" is something more than a pedantic expression of the law. Blackstone recognizes it and bases its
existence upon the principle that the agent acts under an " implied command" (Vol. i, 417). Shaw, C. J. (Mass.), in Farwell v. Boston and Worcester Railroad Corporation (1842),
4 Met. 49, and Bigelow, L. C. 688, had this to say, "This rule
is obviously founded on the great principle of social duty, that
every man in the management of his own affairs, whether by
himself or by his agents or servants, shall conduct them as not
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to injure another; and if he does not, and another thereby sustains damage, he shall answer for it."
Aside, however, from the reason for the existence of the rule,
we have to inquire whether or not, in the various jurisdictions,
it is to be applied with all its rigor and severity with reference
to an action of libel against a newspaper corporation, thrown
liable solely through the hatred and enmity a reporter bore one
concerning whom he wrote.
In the case of Clifford v. Press Publishing Company et al.
(Igo3), cited in 79 N. Y. Supp. 767, and. 113 N. Y. St. Reporter, there were two defendants-the Press Publishing Company, which published, and Judson P. Worrell, the reporter
who wrote the libellous article. The following wag responsible
for the suit: "Jacob Dasher, who was shot some time ago in
Stapleton by Frederick Clifford, a saloon-keeper, on the corner
of Canal and Bay Streets, during a street fight, was discharged
yesterday." Both defendants admitted the falsity of the state-ment, and it appeared upon the trial that at previous times true
accounts of the occurrence referred to had been published in the
defendant corporation's newspaper, correctly giving the name
of him who committed the assault, and who was plaintiff's
brother, and stating that he had been held to await the action of
the grand jury. The question upon the trial was whether the
misstatement was intentional. The trial judge rejected evidence as against the corporation tending to show malice towards
the plaintiff on the part of the reporter.
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court the ruling of the court
below was reversed and a new trial ordered, in the following
language, by O'Brien, C. J.:
"We have reached the conclusion, therefore, that it is competent in libel cases to prove as against a newspaper corporation the motives which inspired the publication, and that if they
were shown to be good they may be relied upon for the purpose
of mitigating damages, and if bad, of enhancing them. It
follows, as the motives- of a corporation can only be shown
through- the acts anid.eelings of its agents and. officers, that it
is competent to prove, fot the purpose of recovering punitivedamages, the ill-will or malice which existed at the time on the
part of those who are responsible for the publication of the.
libel, and which it can be shown influenced the publication."
From this opinion Ingraham, J., dissents; but the facts in
the case of Kruger v. Pitass (19oo), 162 N. Y. 154, upon which
he relies, may easily be distinguished from the state of facts
under discussio.n. In this case there were three defendants,
each of whom jtestified he had no malice or ill-will towards the
plaintiff, and the latter, in order to show express malice, justifying a recovery of punitive damages, sought to prove as against
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all that several years before the publication one of them, who
knew nothing about the article until it had been published, haa
made statements expressing contempt and ill-will for the plaintiff never heard by or communicated to the other defendants
before the publication. The evidence being admitted, and the
judgment being recovered against all the defendants, was, upon
appeal; reversed.
It seems strange that in the case of Clifford v. PrcssPublishing Co., supra, that of Bruce v. Reed (1883), io4 Pa. St. 4o8,
was not referred to. The two cases are almost in point, at least
essentially so. Mercur, C. J., delivering the opinion of the
court in the Pennsylvania case, said, " If the libel was written
under his (the editor's) authority and in furtherance of their
(the proprietors') business, they (the proprietors) are responsible whether the wrong resulted from his (the editor's)
mere negligence or from a wanton and reckless purpose to accomplish the business in an unlawful manner."
Wood on 'Master and Servant, pp. 576-83, enunciates the
New York and Pennsylvania rule.
The exact point, however, in Clifford v. Press Publishing
Comnpany seems to have arisen in but comparatively few jurisdictions, and how it would be decided can only be conjectured
from somewhat similar cases.
Manifestly, in the case under discussion the proprietors would
not knowingly have permitted such an article to be published,-this inference must be taken,-consequently, are they (the proprietors) to be mulcted in punitive damages because an employi
did an act which, had it come under their cognizance, would
not have been permitted? At first blush it seems a harsh rule
that would so hold a corporation for an act done solely for the
gratification of a servant's malice. But in a day when almost
every business of any importance is incorporated for the purpose of enjoying the privileges and immunities granted by' law,
and in which individuals cannot share, some rules must be
harsh--or, rather, not harsh, but severe-if the individual is to
have secured to him certain rights which it would be inimical
even to jeopardize.
In this case the reporter probably had an." assignment," and
the events, which he reported thereunder were undoubtedly
taken by his editor to be true; any benefits arising out of the
matters reported and published accrued to the corporation; it
seems to us, with submission, that the corporation should bear
the incidental burdens.
Cooley's Law of Torts, page 228, contains this statement,
The publisher of a newspaper must, at his peril, see that the
supervision of his business is such as to exclude all libellous
publications, and he is responsible, though one is made without
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his knowledge, and notwithstanding stringent regulations made
by himself, which, if observed, would have prevented it."
. In Commercial Gazette Co. v. Grooms (1889), io Ohio Dig.
Reprint, 489, and 21 Ohio Weekly Law Bulletin, page 29o, it
was held that if the employi with whom authority and dis-cretion to ptiblish the- libel was intrusted was guilty of actual
malice towards.the plaintiff, the newspaper corporation is liable
in exemplary damages for the publication of the libel.
The. court held in Morning Journal Ass'n v. Rutherford
(i892), 51 Fed. Rep. 513, and U. S. App. 296, that it was
proper to instruct the jury that if the article was wantonly pub-lished. without inquiry. or justifiable motive, or under circumstances of gross negligence, it was their (the jury's) right to
award, besides -actual damages,_such punitive or exemplary
damages as the facts warranted.
To the same effect see Press Publishing Company v. McDonald, 63 Fed. 238 (1894); Mallory v. Bennett (1883), 15
Fed. 371.
Haines v. Schultz (1888), 5o N. J. -Law (21 Vroom) 481,
14 Ati. Rep. 488, held that where libellous language is inserted
in a -newspaper by a reporter without the knowledge or consent
*of the proprietor the latter is liable to the extent of compensatory damages, and for punitive damages only on proof
from which his approval of his employi's conduct may .be
legally inferred.
In Goodrich v. Stone (x846), 52 Mass. (Ii Metcalf) 486, the
proprietor and publisher of a newspaper, being sued for a libel
published in his paper, filed a specification of defence stating
that he should prove that the publication complained of was
inserted in his paper during his absence, without his consent or
knowledge, by accident, and without thq knowledge or agency
of any person in his employment. On the trial it appeared that
the defendant-had employed F. to print the newspaper, that F.
employed several workmei under him, and that S., one of
F.'s workmen, set up the libellous article in the"absence of the
defendant and of the editor of the paper. The defendant proposed to ask a witness " if, at or about the time S. printed the
article, or set it up, he" (the -witness) "heard him express illwill towards the plaintiff; and, if so, what he said." Held the
question could not be put.
In Detroit Daily Post Company et al. v. McArthur (1868),
3 Jemison- (Mich.) 447, the court say: "The employment of
competent editors, the supervision- by proper persons of all that
is to be inserted, and the establishment and habitual enforcement
of such rules as would probably exclude improper items should
exempt a publisher from any aggravation of damages on
account of the express malice of his subordinates, for any libel
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published without his privity or approval. But if it. should
appear that he was wanting in reasonable care to prevent abuses,
he would be liable to increased damages for his own misconduct,
which might fairly be regarded as identifying him with facts
which he took no pains to suppress."
Atkins v. Johnson (187o), 43 Vt. 78, held that a journalist
cannot protect himself from the consequences of publishing a
libellous article by assurances of its truthfulness, and by a contract of indemnity from the writer of the libel. This case comes
within the rule that there can be no contribution between joint
wrongdoers.
In Childers V. Mercury P. and P. Company "(i894), 105.Cal.
284, we find that "Exemplary damages may be recovered when
malice on the part of the defendant is established as a fact, either
actually, or by presumption or by inference of fact from the
libellous character of the publication.
Synder v. Fulton (i87o), 34 Md. 128, was a case in which
the court held that, if the publication proceed from expres3
malice or ill-will, the jury may.award such exemplary or punitive damages as they may think the facts of the case justify.
I.576.
To the same effect see Knight v. Foster (1859); 39 N. .The trend of the law seems to be towards the New York and
Pennsylvania doctrines and, with submission, we think the decisions enunciating it are sound. The public has a right to
expect that newspaper reporters are under such surveillance
that nothing libellous "will appear in their proprietors' papers;
otherwise the press might easily become the machine of unscrupulous individuals who sought not to inform the public as
to current events, but rather to impair reputations. If for any
reason proper surveillance is not exercised over officers and
agents, the fault lies with the corporation, and they should respond accordingly.
In many of the states the point here raised has never been
decisively decided; nevertheless, the admission of evidence in"
somewhat similar cases shows a leaning towards the New York
doctrine. The decision in Clifford v. Press Publishing-Company is important, and a few years will doubtless see the courts
in the various jurisdictions either -adopting or registering it.
We think the cases already decided which in anyway bear upon
the point justify the belief that it will soon become settled law
"that it is competent to prove, for the purpose of recovering
punitive damages, the ill-will or malice -which existed at the
time on the part of those who are responsible for the publication
of the libel, and which it can be shown influenced the publication."
LC.K.

